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I.   INTRODUCTION
 The anticircumvention rules—which Congress enacted in 19981 to 
bolster the implementation of technological protection measures 
(TPMs) designed to prevent unauthorized use of copyright-protected 
materials—have been subjected to unrelenting criticism.2 In this Ar-
                                                                                                                   
 * Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. I wish to acknowledge 
the helpful comments and suggestions that I received from Omri Ben-Shahar, Noah Hall, 
Peter Hammer, and Richard Johnson. ©2006 John A. Rothchild. 
 1. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). 
 2. The critics are numerous. For a sampling, see June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention 
Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 467-69 (2004) (listing the main categories of criticisms of the an-
ticircumvention rules); Reto M. Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright in the Information So-
ciety: Reaction of the Scientific Community to Over-Protection and What Policy Makers 
Should Learn, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 103, 113-18 (2006) (criticizing the rules as 
granting copyright owners too much power, interfering with the free movement of goods, cur-
tailing consumer prerogatives, and so on); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: 
Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L.
REV. 813, 844 (2001) (“[T]he [anticircumvention rules] replace[] the public interest in the 
creation and dissemination of works of authorship with the private interest of maximizing 
the revenue of copyright owners.”); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital 
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 519 (1999); ELECT. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: SEVEN YEARS UNDER
THE DMCA 1 (2006), http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/DMCA_unintended_v4.pdf (criticizing the 
rules for interfering with free expression, scientific research, fair use, and competition). 
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ticle I add another critical voice to the chorus, but from a new per-
spective. I argue not for modification or elimination of the rules, but 
rather for complementary legislation that corrects a feature of the 
rules that has until now been overlooked: implementing the techno-
logical protections that the anticircumvention rules promote imposes 
costs on persons who are not parties to the transactions that give rise to 
the costs. The fact that these harms are externalized leads to an over-
supply of TPMs. Standard economic theory calls for a regulatory re-
sponse that brings about a reduction in the use of TPMs to an efficient 
level. My proposal is to implement some such regulatory response. 
 My argument proceeds as follows. Since my proposal treats crea-
tive authorship as a productive activity subject to the usual laws of 
supply and demand, I begin in Part II by countering the doctrine of 
copyright exceptionalism—the naïve view that creative authorship, 
being a public good, is uniquely subject to unauthorized appropria-
tion and therefore sui generis in the public policy issues it presents. I 
do this by showing that virtually all productive activity, not just that 
associated with creative authorship, is subject to unauthorized ap-
propriation in varying degrees and, therefore, has a public-good as-
pect. I then make a terminological shift: rather than continuing to re-
fer to the public-good aspect of creative authorship, I speak of the 
positive externalities generated by that activity. These two formula-
tions are, as I explain, simply two different ways of characterizing a 
single phenomenon. Thus, employing the new terminology, I show 
that nearly all productive activity generates positive externalities. 
 The advantage of using the rubric of externalities is that it helps 
us to recognize two parallels that are crucial to my argument. The 
first is the parallel between the positive externalities generated by 
creative authorship and those resulting from other types of produc-
tive activity. The second is the parallel between the negative exter-
nalities resulting from the use of TPMs and the negative external-
ities arising from other types of productive activity. Recognition of 
these parallels supports my argument that similar regulatory re-
gimes should be applied to the realms of creative authorship and of 
productive activity more generally, as far as control of externalities is 
                                                                                                                   
 Of course, the anticircumvention rules also have their supporters. See BRUCE A.
LEHMAN, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 230 (1995), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf (proposing enactment of anticir-
cumvention rules); Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Protection of Technological Measures Protect-
ing Works of Authorship: International Obligations and the US Experience, 29 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 11, 12 (2005) (“[L]egal protection for technological measures has helped foster new 
business models that make works available to the public at a variety of price points and 
enjoyment options, without engendering the ‘digital lockup’ and other copyright owner 
abuses that many had feared.”). 
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concerned. Such regulatory parity is already in effect in the form of 
legal regimes that allow creative authors and other producers to re-
tain some of what would otherwise be positive externalities of their 
activities—copyright law in the case of the former and patent, trade 
secrecy, trademark, and contract laws in the case of the latter. My 
argument is that the same parity should apply in the case of negative
externalities, implying a regulatory requirement that publishers im-
plementing TPMs internalize the external costs of their use. 
 In Part III, I demonstrate that publishers’ use of TPMs creates 
several types of negative externalities. Specifically, TPMs bring 
about a contraction of the public domain, reduce access to creative 
works through elimination of a market in used copies of those works, 
and potentially interfere with the working of a competitive market-
place. As with the positive externalities previously discussed, this 
characteristic of TPMs is shared with a variety of other productive 
activities that cause harms to third parties. Perhaps the most famil-
iar such harm is pollution. Standard economic theory holds that if 
these harms are not internalized to the producer, they will be over-
supplied—hence the range of regulatory responses to pollution. Ap-
plying the same reasoning, I argue that if the externalized harms 
caused by TPM use are not internalized to the publisher, TPMs will 
be overproduced—that is, publishers will implement TPMs in a 
quantity higher than that which optimizes societal welfare. 
 Thus, in Part IV I argue that there is a need for regulatory action 
aimed at confronting publishers with the externalized harms result-
ing from their TPM usage. Drawing from regulatory approaches that 
are routinely applied to other types of productive activities that cre-
ate negative externalities, I canvass four possible approaches: tradi-
tional command-and-control regulation, reliance upon Coasean bar-
gaining, Pigouvian taxes, and cap-and-trade allowances. The discus-
sion addresses the advantages and disadvantages of each approach 
and—while recognizing that information shortfalls make any ap-
proach experimental at best—recommends implementing the last of 
these, cap-and-trade, as being the most market-oriented. 
II.   AGAINST COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONALISM
 The conventional justification for granting authors control over 
certain uses of their creative works is that in the absence of such con-
trol prospective authors would lack the incentive to create. The prod-
uct of creative authorship, it is said, is a public good. It is a truism of 
economic theory that public goods will not be produced or will be un-
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derproduced unless the government takes some role in producing 
them or encouraging production by the private sector.3
 In this Part, I argue that analysis of public policy with respect to 
copyright must begin with the recognition that the provision of works 
of authorship is not uniquely afflicted with the incentives problem 
that derives from its status as a public good. To the contrary, most 
productive activities feature, to varying extents, a public-good aspect; 
or, to make the same point in terms that facilitate analysis, most 
productive activity results in positive externalities. 
 Placing creative authorship within a broader context of productive 
activity that involves externalities will lead, in Part IV, to my pro-
posal that the public policy tools that are traditionally applied to 
counter negative externalities should also be applied in formulating 
copyright policy. 
A.   The Public-Good Nature of Creative Authorship 
 Creative authorship is conventionally regarded as a public good, 
being both nonrival4 and, in the absence of the legal protection of-
fered by copyright laws, nonexcludable.5 A work of authorship is non-
rival because, for example, the fact that one person is reading a book 
does not prevent another person from reading another copy of the 
same book. A work of authorship is nonexcludable to the extent that 
it is impractically expensive to prevent others from copying it.6 The 
problem with public goods is that in the absence of government in-
tervention, they are undersupplied, since the producer will find it dif-
ficult, at least under traditional business models,7 to receive payment 
for its efforts.8
                                                                                                                   
 3. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC 
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 3 (2d ed. 1996) (locating this insight in the writing of Adam 
Smith).
 4. A good is nonrival if one person’s use of it does not interfere with another person’s use. 
 5. A good is nonexcludable if it is impossible or prohibitively expensive to limit ac-
cess to the good. The definition of a “public good” as one that is nonrival and nonexcludable 
is a common one, but there are differing views on what makes a good public, even among 
writers of basic economics textbooks: some require only nonrivalry, some only nonexclud-
ability, and some introduce the factor of indivisibility. STEPHEN SHMANSKE, PUBLIC GOODS,
MIXED GOODS, AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 191 n.1 (1991). 
 6. Although works of authorship may be nonrival and nonexcludable, the physical 
instantiations of them, which in most cases are required for them to have any utility, are 
both rival and excludable. See Kenneth D. Goldin, Equal Access vs. Selective Access: A Cri-
tique of Public Goods Theory, in THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE 69, 82 (Tyler Cowen ed. 
1988) (“Ideas are of little value unless they [sic] distributed and/or used. Selective access to 
the distribution of ideas is easy (by charging fees for books or demonstrations) . . . .”); see
also NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, LAW, ECONOMICS AND CYBERSPACE 51 
(2004).
 7. The traditional model for publishers of creative authorship involves locking up 
one’s content and allowing access to it for a fee. In many contexts it has proven feasible to 
make money through some other business model, making copyright largely irrelevant to 
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 Thus, the conventional utilitarian justification for the legal pro-
tection provided by copyright is that it is needed to overcome the 
public-good problem. The standard economic analysis of copyright 
posits that the cost of producing an exemplar of a work of authorship 
has two components: the fixed cost of creating the work and the vari-
able cost of producing copies of it. For publishing copies to be a prof-
itable endeavor, the publisher must be able to charge a price that 
covers both of these components of its costs. This requires charging 
more than the marginal cost of producing a copy.  
 If a competitor can costlessly appropriate the value of the author’s 
creative effort, it can make money selling copies at the marginal cost 
of production (plus an increment that yields a normal rate of return). 
This is ruinous for the original publisher, which must either meet the 
competitor’s price and never recover its fixed costs of creation or 
charge enough to recover those costs but see its sales drop to zero as 
it is undercut by the competition. The prospective author will calcu-
late ex ante that authorship may be fulfilling but will not pay the 
rent and will instead direct his efforts to some more remunerative 
(though quite possibly less socially beneficial) endeavor. Society will 
then have to look elsewhere for sources of creative expression.  
 Copyright saves the day, granting authors (and, via transfer of 
copyright ownership, their publishers) the right to exclude others 
from certain uses of the fruits of their creative efforts. Potential com-
petitors are precluded from appropriating costlessly the bulk of the 
economic value of what the author creates—precluded, that is, from 
copying or adapting the work or from distributing, performing, or 
displaying the work publicly.9
B.   Partial Public Goodness 
 One key to recognizing the parallel between creative authorship 
and other types of productive activity with respect to their public-
good nature is the observation that public goodness is not a categori-
cal attribute but is rather a characteristic that may be present to 
                                                                                                                   
the incentive to produce. For example, many website operators make money without limit-
ing access to their content, such as by allowing advertisements to be posted on their 
pages or by driving business to affiliated websites. For a taxonomy of e-commerce 
business models, see Michael Rappa, Business Models on the Web, 
http://digitalenterprise.org/models/models.html (last visited July 3, 2007). 
 8. B. CURTIS EATON & DIANE F. EATON, MICROECONOMICS 470 (2d ed. 1991) (“In 
many circumstances, if pure public goods are to be produced at all, they will be produced 
by some public authority rather than by profit-seeking firms, because no firm can profit by 
providing a nonexcludable good.”). 
 9. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
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varying degrees.10 The enjoyment I receive from sitting in the sun on 
an unspoiled beach may not be lessened if you pull up a chair at 
some distance from me, but it would be somewhat reduced if ten peo-
ple sat nearby engaging in noisy activities and would be ruined if a 
thousand others had the same idea—so aesthetic goods may be par-
tially nonrival.11 If I want to prevent strangers from filching peaches 
from the trees in my front yard, I can at minimal cost put up a “Private 
Property, No Trespassing” sign to exclude many of them, but to exclude 
all of them, I would have to hire a security guard at prohibitive cost—so 
my home-grown peaches are only partially nonexcludable. 
 Creative authorship too may exhibit degrees of excludability.12
The excludability of a good depends on several factors. One such fac-
tor is the cost of controlling access to the good in relation to its value. 
A valuable trade secret, such as the recipe for the eleven herbs and 
spices used in making Kentucky Fried Chicken, is highly excludable 
because its value to Yum! Brands, Inc., the current owner of the KFC 
brand, is very high, making the company’s precautions against dis-
closure cost effective.13 A studio-produced movie, on the other hand, 
is only partially excludable, because the cost of perfect exclusion—
keeping the film in a vault, with no public showing or distribution—
is too high. Copying the design of a boat hull or a semiconductor chip 
is not cheap, but it is much less expensive than creating the design 
oneself, so those designs are highly nonexcludable with respect to the 
relevant copiers.14 In recognition of that fact, Congress enacted sui 
generis protection of both types of designs.15
                                                                                                                   
 10. See DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF 
THEORY TO POLICY 134-38 (4th ed. 1993); Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private 
Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2066 (2000). 
 11. This feature of partial nonrivalry is sometimes referred to as “congestion.” See
SHMANSKE, supra note 5, at 25. 
 12. I limit the discussion here to degrees of excludability, passing over the possibility 
of degrees of nonrivalry, since it is excludability that determines whether a prospective au-
thor will have an economic incentive to create. 
 13. The secret blend of herbs and spices is produced by two different suppliers, each of 
which knows the recipe for and produces only one portion of the blend. KFC Corp. v. 
Marion-Kay Co., 620 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D. Ind. 1985). The two portions are then 
combined and provided to KFC franchisees. Id.; see also Wikipedia, KFC, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KFC (last visited July 3, 2007) (“The Colonel’s ‘secret recipe’ of 
11 herbs and spices is marketed as one of the best-kept trade secrets. The original hand-
written recipe is purportedly locked in a vault in Louisville, Kentucky, with partial copies 
elsewhere as backup.”). 
 14. For an economic analysis of copying the design of boat hulls and semiconductor 
chips, see Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1591-1607 (2002). 
 15. For boat design protection, see Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
304, 112 Stat. 2905 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1301-32, 1338, 1400, 
1498 (2000)). According to a report from the Copyright Office evaluating the Act, “Much of 
the support for enacting the VHDPA was based on the fact that there are strong incentives 
for pirates to infringe boat designs because of the enormous resources that must be in-
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 The extent to which creative authorship is excludable also de-
pends on its format and on the relevant copying technology, which 
together determine the cost and feasibility of making copies that are 
close substitutes. Before the development of movable type, the ex-
pression contained in a book was relatively excludable, since it was 
costly to make a copy. In an age of photocopy machines and comput-
erized typesetting equipment, literary expression is less excludable, 
since copies that are close substitutes can often be made at a cost 
that is less than their economic value. Text on a website may be 
practically nonexcludable, since the cost to make a perfect copy is 
virtually zero and the cost of excluding unauthorized users (such as 
by adding password protection) may be prohibitive because it deters 
desired viewers. 
 A sculptural work is more excludable than a two-dimensional 
artwork, since the available substitutes (photographs, drawings) are 
not close ones and the cost of duplicating a sculpture is much higher 
than that of copying most two-dimensional works. 
 Thus, when discussing the public-good nature of an activity, we 
should speak of degrees of public goodness. This is, however, linguis-
tically inconvenient. Fortunately, there is a related concept that will 
allow us to discuss the issues in less convoluted terms—the concept 
of externality. An externality exists when the activity of an economic 
agent affects the welfare of another party in a manner that is outside 
the legal control of that other party.16 Thus, a producer’s decision to 
implement a particular mode of production results in a positive ex-
ternality when it has the effect of producing some benefit for a pro-
ducer or consumer who is not a party to any transaction involving 
the resulting product. In other words, if the consequence of an ac-
tivity is a public good, then that activity has positive external-
                                                                                                                   
vested in research to develop new designs or innovations.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE & U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE VESSEL HULL DESIGN PROTECTION ACT: OVERVIEW 
AND ANALYSIS 19 (2003).  
 For semiconductor design protection, see Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (2000)); Al-
tera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Pirate firms can strip 
the layers of a semiconductor chip and replicate the design at a cost substantially lower 
than the original firm’s investment.”). 
 16. See SHMANSKE, supra note 5, at 30 (An externality is “when some production, con-
sumption, or exchange activity that occurs between agents affects the utility function or 
production function of some noncontracting agent.”). To be an externality, the effect on 
third parties must not be reflected in the price of the transaction. See HYMAN, supra
note 10, at 91 (“Externalities are costs or benefits of market transactions not reflected 
in prices.”). 
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ities.17 It is the nonexcludability of public goods that gives rise to 
positive externalities.18
C.   Creative Authorship as a Species of Productive Activity 
 The discussion above has established that (1) the public-good na-
ture of creative authorship is the conventional justification of legal 
protection of copyright19 and (2) creative authorship is a partial, not a 
pure, public good—a characteristic that we can describe more con-
veniently by saying that authorship, in the absence of legal protec-
tion against unauthorized use, generates positive externalities to 
various extents depending on context.20 Copyright serves the pur-
pose of enabling an author to internalize some of the economic 
value of her creations that would otherwise be available to all tak-
ers as an externality. 
 The argument of this Section builds on the above points by show-
ing that generation of positive externalities is not unique to creative 
authorship; on the contrary, it is characteristic of many other types 
of productive activity. As is the case with creative authorship, the ex-
istence of these externalities interferes with producers’ incentives; if 
externalization of benefits prevents prospective producers from re-
ceiving a reasonable return, they will lack an ex ante incentive to en-
gage in productive activity. To prevent this from happening, legal 
rules allow ordinary producers to internalize some of those external-
ized benefits, just as copyright offers this capability to authors. 
 The Section continues by identifying those factors which make 
the existence of positive externalities more or less of a problem 
from the standpoint of assuring that producers—both authors and 
industrialists—have the optimal economic incentive to engage in 
productive activity. 
1.   Authors and Other Producers 
 Many types of productive activity give rise to positive external-
ities. Consider the production of an archetypal hard good—the 
economist’s “widget”—consisting of an item that must be conceived, 
                                                                                                                   
 17. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 3, at 6 (“public goods can be thought of as spe-
cial cases of externalities”). 
 18. For examples of the use of this terminology in the copyright context, see Julie E. 
Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 366 (2005) (“It is 
widely acknowledged that some fair uses, including many transformative uses, create posi-
tive externalities from which society as a whole benefits greatly . . . .”); Alfred C. Yen, A
Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technology, Copyright Liability, and 
the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247, 262 (2001) (“To the ex-
tent that external benefits conferred on free riders cause the underproduction of copyright-
able subject matter, copyright law can be used to internalize those external benefits . . . .”). 
 19. Part II.A, supra.
 20. Part II.B, supra.
2007]             TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION MEASURES 1189 
developed into a commodity for which there is demand, produced, 
and marketed. As with works of authorship, the cost of producing a 
hard good has both fixed and marginal components. The fixed costs 
include the costs of developing the product and investment in facili-
ties that are used to produce it. Marginal costs are the additional 
costs, such as for materials and labor inputs, that increase along 
with the quantity manufactured. The total cost of producing an ex-
emplar of a product consists of an allocated share of the fixed costs 
plus the marginal cost associated with producing that exemplar. 
 A competitor of the original producer of an item can gain a com-
petitive advantage if it is able to reduce the costs of its production be-
low those experienced by the original producer. One way it may do 
this is by lowering its fixed costs through appropriating information 
that the original producer has, at some cost to itself, generated dur-
ing the process of bringing the good to market. The information that 
the competitor may profitably appropriate includes (1) the original 
idea for the product; (2) the design of the product; (3) the fact that 
there is consumer demand for the product, which may be acquired 
through expenditures on surveys, focus group testing, and other 
market research;21 and (4) the most effective channels of marketing 
or distributing the product.22 In the absence of any right to prevent 
appropriation, this information is a positive externality of the origi-
nal producer’s productive activity.23
 As with copyright, legal rules reserve some, but not all, of the 
value of these externalities for the original producer. (1) The concep-
tion of the product may be protected, if at all, only by contract. The 
person who conceives the idea may disclose it to another on terms 
that contractually obligate the other not to make use of the idea in a 
way that harms the interests of the conceiver. However, any such re-
striction cannot bind third parties, such as potential competitors who 
learn of the product through observation of the marketplace. (2) The 
                                                                                                                   
 21. Uncertainty about whether a particular product will succeed in the marketplace 
gives rise to “selection bias.” See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Prop-
erty, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 115 (1990). “There will be hits and misses. The origi-
nal designer bears the costs of both; the copier duplicates only the hits.” Id.
 22. For a somewhat different categorization of the types of informational assets that a 
competitor can appropriate from the original producer, see Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra
note 14, at 1586-88 (detailing the development process of reverse-engineered products). 
 23. Second comers may also benefit from the original producer’s efforts in ways that 
do not involve the appropriation of information. For example, competitors can take advan-
tage of the increase in market demand for the product that is created by the original pro-
ducer’s marketing efforts. Consumers might not realize, for example, that they have a need 
for Christmas-tree-shaped automobile air fresheners that dangle from the rearview mirror 
until a pioneer producer disseminates marketing messages that prove this is so. Competi-
tors can forgo the expenses needed to create this market demand. The original producer 
may be able to internalize some of the value thus created through branding its product, in-
voking trademark law. However, branding is unlikely to succeed in excluding competitors 
from an entire product category. 
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design of the product may be obvious from the face of it or may re-
quire some effort to discover. Aspects of the design may enjoy legal 
protection through laws protecting trade secrets or through patent 
law. The efficacy of these legal protections is limited. Trade secret 
protection may in principle last indefinitely, but will be unavailing if 
the owner does not make reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy or 
if the secret can be discovered by observation.24
 With a few narrow exceptions,25 there is no legal right to prevent 
competitors from reverse engineering ordinary goods to uncover their 
design.26 Patent protection lasts no more than twenty years, after 
which the right to make the product and the information regarding 
how to make it and how best to use it (which is disclosed in the pat-
ent application) are freely appropriable. Moreover, many industrial 
inventions and designs are not patentable or are not of sufficient 
value to justify the expense of obtaining a patent. (3) The fact that 
there is consumer demand for the product is hard to conceal once the 
product is in the marketplace, though a producer may seek to limit 
the amount of information available to potential competitors by not 
releasing its sales figures. (4) The method of marketing or distribut-
ing the product might, but usually will not, be protectable by a busi-
ness method patent. 
 Beyond these limited legal protections, original producers have 
another powerful ally enabling them to recover their development 
costs and make a profit despite the best efforts of imitative competi-
tors, namely the first-mover advantage. Simply put, it takes second 
comers a while to accomplish their copying. During that interval the 
original producer is insulated from the negative effects of a competi-
tor’s acquisition of competitively significant information at a lower 
cost than the original producer had to pay.27
 In view of these considerations, it is clear that the positive-
externality-generating (or public-good) aspect of creative authorship 
is not unique but is only a particular manifestation of a characteris-
tic applying to productive activity in general. Like a prospective au-
thor, the prospective original producer of an ordinary hard good is 
assumed to engage in an ex ante calculation whether to invest in de-
velopment and production of a product that takes into account 
(among other considerations) the appropriability of competitively im-
                                                                                                                   
 24. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) & cmt. (1985). 
 25. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing legal prohibitions against 
reverse engineering of boat hulls and semiconductor chip topographies). 
 26. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (1985) (recognizing reverse engineering as 
a proper means of uncovering a trade secret); Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 14, at 
1582 (“Reverse engineering has always been a lawful way to acquire a trade secret . . . .”). 
 27. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2506-11 (1994). 
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portant information by second comers. If the value that competitors 
are able freely to appropriate is so significant that the original pro-
ducer cannot hope to make a profit, then the would-be producer will 
invest elsewhere. 
 Thus, both prospective authors and prospective producers of ordi-
nary goods can, with some justification, claim that they require legal 
prohibition against free appropriation of at least some of the intellec-
tual spinoffs of their productive activities if they are to have an ade-
quate economic incentive to engage in such activity. If there is a dis-
tinction to be made between these two cases, it is not in the existence 
of appropriable effort, but rather in its extent. That is, in different 
contexts there may be differences in the magnitude of the advan-
tage vis-à-vis the original producer that a second comer can derive 
from his appropriation of externalized benefits created by the 
original producer. The next Section analyzes the determinants of 
the magnitude and the significance to the original producer of this 
appropriable value. 
2.   Comparative Appropriability 
 Since our goal is to ascertain the impact that externalization of 
benefits has on authors’ and producers’ incentives to engage in crea-
tive and productive activities, we should view the situation from the 
standpoint of the author/producer. 
 The producer’s enterprise will be a profitable one only if it can sell 
its product for more than its average total cost of production, or ATC.
The ATC consists of the total cost of manufacturing a given quantity 
of output, divided by that quantity. The total cost of manufacturing, 
or TC, is the sum of two components: the total fixed cost, or FC, and 
total variable cost, or VC. FC is the amount of the producer’s ex-
penses (such as equipment, office rental, product development, and 
so on) that do not vary with output. VC is the amount of the pro-
ducer’s expenses that do vary with output (such as cost of materials, 
labor costs, and so on). 
 What the second comer achieves by copying is a reduction in its 
fixed costs. In the case of ordinary goods, the reduction might be in 
expenses for market research and product development. In the case 
of works of authorship, the savings come from eliminating the cost of 
creating the work, which may consist either of the opportunity cost 
(if the second comer would otherwise be the creator) or the actual 
cost of acquiring the rights to a work (if the second comer would oth-
erwise hire or commission another to create the work). 
 The second comer usually cannot appropriate all of the intellec-
tual spinoffs of the original producer’s activity. For example, the ex-
pertise the original producer achieves through its development ef-
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forts is something that the second comer may not be able to acquire 
through copying activities, as is the advantage of being first to mar-
ket with the product. The proportion of the original producer’s fixed 
costs that the second comer can appropriate will depend on the par-
ticular circumstances; more or less of the value generated by the 
original producer’s productive activity may be locked up in a non-
appropriable form. 
 The second comer’s advantage will be limited in another way too. 
The enterprise of copying is usually not costless; the second comer 
incurs certain expenses to accomplish the appropriation. For ordi-
nary goods, this might include the expense of gathering information 
about the efforts of other producers, assessing which products and 
manufacturing techniques are most successful, and reverse engineer-
ing a product to determine how it is made. In the case of works of au-
thorship, the costs of copying may be substantial (as with the cost of 
copying a book by quill pen or the cost of duplicating a sculptural 
form) or nearly costless (as with the cost of copying a digital file)—
but in any case, the costs of copying must be less than the cost of in-
dependently creating a competing work28 or the game would not be 
worth the candle. Thus, to determine the advantage the second 
comer gains with respect to the original producer we must subtract 
the second comer’s copying expenses from the value of what has 
been appropriated. 
 From the standpoint of competitive advantage, the relevant factor 
is the percentage of the cost reduction, rather than its absolute 
value.29 The percentage of the second comer’s savings is the amount 
of its savings divided by the original producer’s costs. Putting to-
gether the above considerations into a single equation, we find that 
the second comer’s comparative advantage is: 
,
opop
scop
VCFC
CEFCA
?
??
where
 A is the portion of the original producer’s fixed costs that the sec-
ond comer is able to appropriate (0 < A < 1); 
 FCop is the original producer’s fixed costs; 
 CEsc is the second comer’s copying expenses; and 
                                                                                                                   
 28. A competing work might be one that is identical to the original, if it is not pro-
tected by copyright, or one that prospective purchasers view as a close substitute, if it is. 
 29. A one-dollar cost reduction in producing a car that sells for $30,000 will give the 
producer no significant comparative advantage. The same cost reduction on a two-dollar 
item is significant enough to ruin the competition. 
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 VCop is the original producer’s variable costs for some given quan-
tity of production.30
 It follows that the second comer’s comparative advantage will de-
pend on several factors. First, the greater the proportion of the origi-
nal producer’s fixed costs that is appropriable (that is, the larger that 
A is), the greater the second comer’s advantage. Second, the smaller 
the variable costs in proportion to fixed costs (VCop/FCop), the greater 
the second comer’s advantage. This ratio will depend both on the na-
ture of the productive activity (some types of production are inher-
ently more capital-intensive than others) and on the quantity of the 
output (at higher levels of output fixed costs become of decreasing 
significance). Third, the smaller the second comer’s copying expenses 
(CEsc), the greater the second comer’s advantage. 
 By considering the comparative magnitudes of these factors in 
connection with different sorts of productive activity, we can at-
tempt to get some idea of the impact of free appropriability on the 
incentives experienced by creative authors and by producers of or-
dinary goods. 
(a)   Appropriable Proportion of Fixed Costs 
 The value of A is likely to be higher in connection with many 
products of intellectual activity than in connection with the produc-
tion of ordinary goods. A second comer can potentially appropriate 
nearly all of the effort the original producer expended in creating a 
work of authorship as well as the knowledge that there is market 
demand for it.31 The value of A will depend in part upon the medium 
of expression. With some media, the second comer’s copy is nearly a 
perfect substitute for the original. This is true of works in digital 
formats: music on CD, movies on DVD, digitized text, and computer 
programs. However, the copier may fail to appropriate ancillary as-
pects of the product’s value, such as its packaging or technical sup-
port from the manufacturer. With other media, the production values 
are of greater significance to the value of the product. This is true, for 
example, of hardcover books (more durable and easier to carry 
around and read than a sheaf of 8½" x 11" photocopied pages) and 
items such as sculpture and paintings that cannot be closely dupli-
cated at an acceptable price.32
                                                                                                                   
 30. For the derivation of this expression, see Appendix A. 
 31. See J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implica-
tions of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV.
639, 660 (1989) (observing that unlike traditional hard goods, an exemplar of a knowledge-
based product (such as a computer program) “tends to bear its know-how on its face” and is 
therefore more copiable). 
 32. Some intangible elements of the value of a work of authorship cannot be appro-
priated at all. The value of an original painting or a limited-edition print signed and num-
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 In addition to the value lost by not being able to make a perfect 
copy in some media, the second comer leaves behind the benefits ac-
cruing to the producer by reason of the creative effort. For an indi-
vidual creator, this might consist of skills that will enable her to cre-
ate a better song, book, or artwork the next time she sets out to do so. 
For a collective endeavor, such as production of a movie or recording 
of a symphony, the nonappropriable value might be the skill needed 
to coordinate the creative efforts of a number of individuals. 
 With ordinary goods, a smaller proportion of the original pro-
ducer’s effort will often be appropriable.33 As with works of author-
ship, the ordinary goods second comer appropriates the value of 
knowing the market response to the product. However, access to an 
exemplar of ordinary productive processes (a piece of furniture, a 
steel beam, an electronic device, a bushel of corn) in most cases does 
not enable the second comer to appropriate a high proportion of the 
value of the fixed costs that went into creating it. Close study of a 
steel beam may not reveal much about the process used to create it, 
nor does it reduce at all the second comer’s expenses in acquiring and 
operating a blast furnace, a rolling mill, or other equipment needed 
to make the beam. Reverse engineering a product may or may not 
reveal much about how the product is made. 34 That knowledge may 
reduce the development expenses that go into the producer’s fixed 
costs, but it does not eliminate them, and it does not obviate the need 
to invest in machinery, land, or other capital resources that are re-
quired for production. Moreover, the second comer’s version is 
unlikely to be as close a substitute for the original as in the case of 
works of authorship, meaning that less of the value contributed by 
the original producer’s fixed expenditures is appropriable. 
 It is quite possible for some components of the fixed costs associ-
ated with a particular product to be more appropriable than other 
components. For example, a book publisher may incur expenses for 
typesetting and editing a manuscript and for promoting the book. 
The promotional expenses are fully appropriable, assuming the sec-
ond comer is addressing the same market as the original publisher. 
                                                                                                                   
bered by the artist may derive in substantial measure from the artist’s personal involve-
ment with the particular copy. This intangible value may be analogized to the branding 
element of an ordinary good that carries a valuable trademark. An exact duplicate of a 
Gucci bag, sans the “Gucci” imprint, is far less valuable than a true Gucci bag. 
 33. In the category of “ordinary goods” we should include works of authorship that are 
in the public domain, unprotected by copyright. Consider a classic work of literature whose 
copyright has expired. A publisher need not pay any royalties to the author, so the pub-
lisher’s fixed costs will consist of the cost of preparing the text for printing. This cost is no 
more appropriable than is the expense of tooling up for production of any ordinary good. 
 34. Automobile manufacturers consider the knowledge gained from reverse engineer-
ing sufficiently valuable that they routinely slice up competitors’ products to learn the se-
crets of their design and composition. See Carl Hoffman, The Teardown Artists, WIRED, Feb. 
2006, at 136, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.02/teardown_pr.html. 
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Typesetting costs may be viewed as nonappropriable, if the second 
comer finds it necessary to reset the type, or largely appropriable to 
the extent that a photographic reproduction serves as a substitute.35
(b)   Ratio of Fixed Costs to Variable Costs 
 It is difficult to generalize about the ratio of fixed to variable costs 
as between works of authorship and ordinary goods. For some works 
of authorship the variable costs are a relatively small fraction of the 
total (or average) costs. A commercial movie studio may spend 
tens of millions of dollars to produce and market a film and pro-
portionately very little on duplicating the result on physical me-
dia. A second comer who is not constrained by copyright has an 
enormous cost advantage. 
 In other situations, however, the cost structure might be just the 
opposite. Consider an unknown rock-and-roll band that has just been 
signed by a record label. The contract may provide that the label 
pays very little to the band, and the costs of producing an album may 
be low. The lion’s share of the label’s costs may be in manufacturing, 
promotion, and distribution.36 At the other extreme, we might con-
sider an unsigned musician who produces his own music in a home 
studio and whose opportunity cost is very low. With small volumes of 
sales and CDs sold to end purchasers rather than through distribu-
tors, the (variable) costs of manufacturing and selling the disks may 
vastly exceed the fixed costs of creation. The creator in such a situa-
tion would have little to fear from second comers, regardless of the 
existence of copyright. 
 Ordinary goods, likewise, fall along a spectrum with respect to the 
ratio of fixed to variable costs. Fixed costs may be dominant, as in 
the case of a product that requires expensive tooling but has low 
costs for materials and production labor. At the other extreme, vari-
able costs may dominate, as is the case with producing jewelry from 
precious metals and gems or building tract housing. 
 In general, the ratio of fixed to variable costs will depend greatly 
on the volume of units produced, because the more units are pro-
duced, the less the fixed costs per unit. Variable costs per unit may 
                                                                                                                   
 35. For illustrations of the magnitudes of the various costs involved in book publishing, 
see generally ALBERT N. GRECO, THE BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 163-69 (2d ed. 2005). 
 36. Promotional expenses may be quite high. According to one estimate, marketing, 
promoting, and touring may cost a major record label between $140,000 and $350,000 for a 
single album. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster 
and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 315 (2002) (citing 
Jon Healey, CD Sticker Shock Accounting for Retail Sale Prices that Drive Song-Swapping 
Sites, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2000, at 1D).
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also decrease with greater volume, to the extent that economies of 
scale exist. 
 Thus, although it may be true more often than not that “the ratio 
of fixed to marginal costs is much higher for information than for 
other types of goods,”37 this is not invariably the case.
(c)   Copying Expenses 
 For most types of works of authorship, we would expect the costs 
of copying the content to be small in comparison with the costs of 
creating the work; that is, CEsc is small compared to FCop. At the 
limit, the cost of copying digitized materials may approach zero: 
making a copy of a word-processing document, a music file in .mp3 
format, a graphic in .jpg or .gif format, or a movie encoded with the 
DVD-Video standard. Copying the design of an integrated circuit 
chip, while costly, is far less expensive than designing the chip in the 
first place.38 Copying nondigital works may cost more. For example, 
making a high-quality lithographic reproduction of an artwork re-
quires substantial skill and expense. In most contexts, however, it 
would seem that the cost of copying would be substantially less than 
the original producer’s cost of creation. In addition to the costs of ac-
tually making the copy, there may be costs for determining whether 
an item is worth copying or locating and obtaining an original to 
copy.
 The cost of copying ordinary goods will vary dramatically depend-
ing on the nature of the item. Just as with works of authorship, what 
the second comer needs to copy is intellectual in origin, namely in-
formation that enables the second comer to avoid bearing some of the 
fixed costs borne by the original producer. Copying from competitors 
may involve various techniques.39 Recommended methods include 
performing chemical analyses and other tests on the competitor’s 
products;40 disassembling, weighing, and labeling each component 
part of a competitor’s product;41 taking a tour of the competitor’s 
                                                                                                                   
 37. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1053 (2005) (emphasis omitted). 
 38. H.R. REP. NO. 98-781, at 2 (1984), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5751 (“The develop-
ment costs for a single new chip can reach $100 million. . . . A competing firm can photo-
graph a chip and its layers, and in several months and for a cost of less than $50,000 du-
plicate the mask work of the innovating firm.”). 
 39. The science of figuring out what the competition is doing is called “competitive in-
telligence” or “industrial espionage,” depending on one’s point of view. See LARRY
KAHANER, COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE 16 (1996); TIMOTHY W. POWELL, ANALYZING YOUR 
COMPETITION 18 (1993). There is even a professional society composed of those who engage 
in the activity. See Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, http://www.scip.org 
(last visited July 3, 2007).  
 40. See TONY REID, LEGAL INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 11 (1985).  
 41. See Hoffman, supra note 34. 
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premises;42 looking through the competitor’s trash;43 focus-group test-
ing the competitor’s products;44 and consulting public directories and 
regulatory filings.45 This range of techniques implies a range of val-
ues of CEsc.
D.   Conclusion 
 As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the need for legal rules 
designed to assure that authors will receive adequate economic re-
wards for their efforts and will therefore have an ex ante incentive to 
engage in creative activity is but a special case of the more general 
problem of enabling producers to capture some of the benefits of their 
activity that, in the absence of legally enforceable rights, would be 
lost as positive externalities. Producers of ordinary goods are enabled 
to internalize some of the positive externalities of their efforts 
through legal protection of trade secrets and patents, enforceability 
of confidentiality agreements, and protectability of trademarks. Pro-
ducers also enjoy various degrees of “natural” protection against 
copying by second comers in the form of nonappropriability, high 
costs of copying, the first-mover advantage, and low ratios of fixed to 
variable costs. Copyright protection provides analogous benefits to 
authors, allowing them to internalize some (but not all) of the posi-
tive externalities they generate. 
 Underlining the conclusion that creative authorship is, from the 
standpoint of producer incentives, not fundamentally different from 
any other productive activity is the fact that one form of intellectual 
property protection, copyright, exists to promote the former, while 
other types, patent and trade secrecy, promote the latter. In addition, 
with creative authorship, what the second comer may profitably ap-
propriate is not limited to the content of the copied item (words, 
sounds, images) but, as with other types of productive activity, in-
cludes ancillary intellectual spinoffs such as the existence of a mar-
ket for a particular item. 
 The model developed above identifies the factors that determine 
how significantly the appropriability of the benefits generated by 
productive activity affects the incentives of producers of both ordi-
nary goods and works of authorship. We cannot say categorically that 
appropriability is more of a problem for prospective authors than for 
other prospective producers; that depends on the values of the pa-
rameters identified in the model. 
                                                                                                                   
 42. See RONALD L. MENDELL, THE QUIET THREAT 12-24 (2003). 
 43. See id. at 64. 
 44. See ALAN DUTKA, COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE FOR THE COMPETITIVE EDGE 52-54 
(1999).
 45. See POWELL, supra note 39, at 85-161. 
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III.   USE OF TPMS CREATES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
 Having observed that authors and other producers face analogous 
difficulties due to the positive externalities resulting from their pro-
ductive efforts, it is natural to inquire whether a corresponding anal-
ogy exists with respect to negative externalities.46 It is very common 
for both productive and consumptive activities to have negative im-
pacts on producers and consumers who have no ability to control 
those activities. Polluting emissions from a factory may cause acid 
rain that negatively affects the production of nearby farmers or smog 
that harms the health of consumers. One person’s smoking may in-
jure nonsmokers in the room. 
 As I have argued elsewhere, the use by publishers of TPMs to pre-
vent unauthorized use of their copyrighted products imposes several 
types of costs on society.47 My claim here is that some of these costs 
are appropriately viewed as negative externalities. 
A.   The Social Costs of TPMs 
 The most widely implemented types of TPMs are encryption-based 
technologies that either prevent users from making unauthorized 
copies or limit the devices that may be used to access a particular 
copy. A familiar example of the former is the Content Scramble Sys-
tem (CSS), which is implemented on commercially released movie 
DVDs. CSS makes it impossible to copy such a movie without the use 
of some technology that circumvents the TPM. An example of the lat-
ter type of protection is the tethering technology that prevents a user 
from installing Windows XP on more than one computer or from 
playing an .mp3 music file downloaded from iTunes on more than 
five computers.48
                                                                                                                   
 46. Just as positive externalities are associated with public goods, so negative exter-
nalities are associated with public bads. A public bad is the converse of a public good: it is 
an activity causing harm, rather than benefit, that is both nonrival and nonexcludable. See
Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1297 n.42 (2003) (“The flip side of the public goods problem is the public ‘bads’ prob-
lem—often referred to as the tragedy of the commons—caused by the absence of pricing 
mechanisms that enable cost internalization.”). A public bad exists “when a large number 
of parties are affected negatively and simultaneously . . . by an action” and “[t]he nature of 
the phenomenon is such that there is no low-cost way to insulate and partition the affected 
individuals in the group from the negative effect.” Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Pub-
lic Bads and Public Nuisance: Common Law Remedies for Environmental Decline, 14 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 55, 59-60 (2003). 
 47. See John A. Rothchild, Economic Analysis of Technological Protection Measures,
84 OR. L. REV. 489, 500-14 (2005). 
 48. For a discussion of TPMs designed to protect music, movies, and books, see Besek, 
supra note 2, at 453-60. 
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 In 1998, Congress bolstered the use of TPMs by enacting rules 
that make it illegal to circumvent TPMs.49 Simplified somewhat, 
these anticircumvention rules prohibit three types of conduct. First, 
the rules prohibit circumventing a TPM that controls access to a 
copyrighted work.50 Second, they prohibit trafficking in such circum-
vention technology if the technology does not serve any significant 
legitimate purpose.51 Third, they prohibit trafficking in a technology 
that allows copying of a work protected by a TPM, again if the tech-
nology serves no legitimate purpose.52
 The use of TPMs results in three types of harms affecting people 
who are not participants in any transaction involving a TPM-
protected copy of a copyrighted work—harms that are therefore 
negative externalities.53
 First, use of TPMs results in contraction of the public domain.54
The notional copyright “bargain” between authors and the public 
stipulates that authors are granted legally enforceable exclusive 
rights to exploit their creations in specified ways;55 however, it also 
stipulates that these rights are subject to certain exceptions for the 
benefit of the public56 and that the work is to become freely available 
to all upon expiration of the work’s term of protection.57 The most 
significant limitations on the author’s exclusive rights are (1) the au-
thor has no right to control fair use of the work58 and (2) the exclusive 
rights protect only the author’s expression but not the underlying 
ideas.59 TPMs that prevent the copying of even small portions of a 
work interfere with the exercise of fair-use rights. TPMs that prevent 
unauthorized access to the author’s protected expression also prevent 
access to the author’s unprotected ideas. Access controls and tether-
ing systems deny the public access to a work even after expiration of 
the copyright term.60
                                                                                                                   
 49. The rules were enacted as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 
No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-76 (1998). 
 50. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 51. Id. § 1201(a)(2). 
 52. Id. § 1201(b)(1). 
 53. These harms are discussed at greater length in Rothchild, supra note 47, at 500-14. 
 54. Id. at 501-04. 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 56. See Rothchild, supra note 47, at 499. 
 57. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04 (2000) (establishing duration of copyright protection). 
 58. Rothchild, supra note 47, at 499, 501-03. 
 59. Id. at 499, 503. 
 60. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems 
for Access Control Technologies: Hearing Before the Copyright Office, Library of Congress, 
Docket No. RM 2005-11 (2005) [hereinafter Section 1201 Rulemaking] (Comment of Jim 
Konop, Copyright Office, Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of 
Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works (2006), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/konop.pdf) (Section 1201 prevents copying 
public-domain movies on DVD).  
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 Second, use of tethering technologies can reduce access to creative 
works by eliminating the secondary market.61 The ready availability 
of used books, records, movie DVDs, and music CDs allows those who 
cannot afford the price of new items to purchase them used and al-
lows purchasers of new items to reduce their effective cost by resell-
ing them when they are no longer needed.62 In addition, libraries can 
make these materials temporarily available at no cost to borrowers. 
However, an item that is tethered to a particular user’s machine 
cannot be lent by a library and cannot be sold to anybody else.63
 Third, TPMs may be implemented in a manner that harms compe-
tition and innovation.64 Several manufacturers of ordinary consumer 
items, including printer toner cartridges and garage door openers, 
have attempted to stifle competitors by invoking the anticircumven-
tion rules.65 Their argument is based on the fact that, like many con-
sumer goods, these items incorporate electronic components that use 
software code to control their operations.66 Competing products that 
interface with these components must work around this code, giving 
rise to claims that the competitors are engaging in unlawful circum-
vention. The courts have not been very receptive to these arguments 
thus far, but under a new set of factual circumstances they might 
have more traction.67  Use of TPMs may also interfere with innova-
tion by making difficult or impossible certain types of encryption re-
search and reverse engineering.68
B.   TPMs and Externalities 
 These societal harms constitute negative externalities of the pub-
lishers’ use of TPMs. Consider the sale of a copy of a software appli-
cation protected with a tethering restriction that prevents it from be-
ing used on any computer other than the one on which it is first 
loaded. The presence of the TPM has effects not only on the con-
sumer who purchased the software but also on third parties. For one 
thing, the tethering restriction makes it impossible to sell the copy on 
the secondary market (unless it is sold together with the computer on 
                                                                                                                   
 61. Rothchild, supra note 47, at 504-05.
 62. Id.
 63. Id.
 64. Id. at 507-13.
 65. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 529 
(6th Cir. 2004) (involving computer chips in toner cartridges); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. 
Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (involving garage door openers). 
 66. See Zohar Efroni, A Momentary Lapse of Reason: Digital Copyright, the DMCA 
and a Dose of Common Sense, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 249, 295 (2005) (noting “the wide-
spread use of consumer products that contain one or several computer programs responsi-
ble for the operation of products in which they are embedded”).
 67. See Rothchild, supra note 47, at 513.
 68. See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 14, at 1647 (describing “the chilling ef-
fects of the DMCA on encryption and computer security research”). 
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which it was originally installed).69 Since the tethering restriction 
means that used copies of Windows XP are unavailable for purchase, 
a person who buys a new PC cannot save money by equipping it with 
a superseded but still serviceable copy of Windows XP obtained at a 
garage sale. Furthermore, the tethering restriction amounts to a 
permanent limitation on the usability of that copy, preventing access 
to the work it contains even beyond expiration of the copyright. The 
important point here is that the preference of impecunious computer 
users for cheap used copies of software and the interest of society in 
populating the public domain with usable copies are not factored into 
the publisher’s decision whether to protect its products with TPMs or 
into the purchaser’s decision of how much to pay for it. The pub-
lisher’s decision whether to implement TPMs is based solely on con-
siderations of maximizing its profits. The full social costs of the deci-
sion to implement TPMs are not factored into the publisher’s cost 
function.70 As a result, the publisher implements more TPMs than 
would be socially optimal. 
 As another example, consider the societal effects of anticopy tech-
nologies. To the extent that a copyrighted work is distributed only in 
formats that are copy-protected, fair-use copying is eliminated.71 Sup-
pose, for example, that the major record labels began releasing their 
recordings exclusively on CDs equipped with an anticopy TPM,72 as is 
                                                                                                                   
 69. The features of a tethering TPM are determined by the individual publisher that 
deploys it. For example, the tethering system accompanying Windows XP, which Microsoft 
refers to as “product activation,” is designed so that it requires reactivation if the user re-
places a certain number of components of her computer, and reactivation is permitted only 
by Microsoft’s leave. See Microsoft, Windows XP Product Activation (2002), 
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/evaluation/features/activation.mspx (“If you overhaul 
your computer by replacing a substantial number of hardware components, it may appear 
to be a different PC. You may have to reactivate Windows XP.”). The End User Li-
cense Agreement accompanying Windows XP explains that the user’s copy of the soft-
ware can only be used on the computer with which the user obtained the software.
See, e.g., Microsoft Corporation, Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition (Retail) End-
User License Agreement for Microsoft Software (June 1, 2004), available at
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/home/eula.mspx. Therefore, the product-activation 
technology presumably prevents a copy of Windows XP from being used on a new computer 
that the user buys. 
 70. Some of the social costs of a tethering restriction may be factored into the pub-
lisher’s implementation decision through a reduction in the price that purchasers are will-
ing to pay: a purchaser should be willing to pay more for an untethered copy, which he ex-
pects to be able to resell on the secondary market, than for a tethered copy, which cannot 
be resold. But there are other societal effects that are not brought home to the publisher. 
For example, society may have an interest in widespread availability of products of crea-
tive authorship among those who cannot afford to pay the full price, an interest not shared 
by publishers or purchasers. 
 71. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (fair use). Fair-use copying might be permissible for 
personal noncommercial use, to enable performances permitted under 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) 
(2000) (exemption of certain performances and displays), or for a variety of other purposes. 
See id. §§ 107-22. 
 72. The four major labels control about 72% of the recorded music market. See Paul 
Williams, EMI Ponders Next Move, MUSIC WEEK, May 13, 2006, at 1 (2004 figures). The 
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currently the case with movies on DVDs.73 No fair-use copying of 
popular music would then be possible. For some purposes, copying 
would still be possible by exploiting the “analog hole”: playing the CD 
on one machine and making a recording of the output using a micro-
phone attached to an audio cassette recorder, a video camcorder, or a 
microphone plugged into a computer. But such workarounds will not 
always be available. The result would be an impoverished version of 
fair use,74 a circumstance that has prompted calls for an exception to 
the anticircumvention rules to allow such copying.75 However, soci-
ety’s losses resulting from the impoverishment of fair use are of no 
concern to the publisher, and such costs do not factor into its decision 
whether to implement the TPM. 
 Consider a third scenario. Suppose that manufacturers of ordi-
nary consumer goods containing electronic components succeed in 
avoiding the holdings of two high-profile cases76 that disapproved of 
the invocation of the anticircumvention rules in a manner that could 
interfere with competition, either by redesigning their products77 or 
                                                                                                                   
labels are experimenting with anticopy TPMs. In 2005, Sony BMG released large quanti-
ties of CDs equipped with anticopy technology, leading to a debacle when it was revealed 
that playing the disks in a computer’s CD drive resulted in undisclosed modifications to 
the computer that introduced a serious security hole. See Robert McMillan, Settlement 
Ends Sony Rootkit Case, INFOWORLD DAILY NEWS, May 23, 2006, available at
http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/05/23/78581_HNsonyrootkitsettlement_1.html. EMI is 
testing a different anticopy technology, while Warner and Universal are still on the side-
lines. See Brian Garrity & Susan Butler, Copy Protection’s Future Unclear, BILLBOARD,
Jan. 14, 2006. It remains to be seen whether the major labels will push ahead with imple-
mentation of TPMs throughout their product lines. 
 73. Anticopy technology called the Content Scramble System is currently widely em-
ployed on commercially released movies on DVD, making it impossible to engage in fair-
use copying of DVDs without specialized hardware or software. The best-known provider of 
such software went out of business after battling the movie industry in court. See 321 Stu-
dios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Para-
mount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970, 2004 WL 402756 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); 
321 Studios Ends Operations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at C6. 
 74. See R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Under-
mine the Structure of Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619, 653 (2003). 
 75. In Section 1201 Rulemaking, supra note 60, several commenters proposed an ex-
ception that would allow fair-use copying of portions of movie DVDs and music CDs. See
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Con-
trol Technologies: Hearing Before the Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Docket No. RM 
2005-11 (2005) (Comments of the Library Copyright Alliance and the Music Library Asso-
ciation; Comments of Peter Decherney, Assistant Professor at the University of Pennsyl-
vania’s Cinema Studies Program; Michael Delli Carpini, Professor and Annenberg 
Dean; and Katherine Sender, Assistant Professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Annenberg School of Communication; and Comment of Jeff Fessler), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/decherney_upenn.pdf. 
 76. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 
2004); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 77. In Lexmark, a manufacturer of printer toner cartridges containing a chip designed 
to prevent its printers from accepting cartridges made by competing manufacturers argued 
that a supplier of cloned chips was trafficking in devices that allowed access to copyrighted 
software code in the printer. 387 F.3d at 529. The court denied the claim on the ground 
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by contractually limiting their customers’ rights to use their products 
in connection with products made by third parties.78 As other com-
mentators have noted, neither case rules out the possibility that the 
anticircumvention rules might be used to stifle competition.79 If the 
rules were so interpreted, manufacturers could broadly eliminate 
competition from aftermarket manufacturers.80 The harm to society 
that would result from this dearth of competition would not be fac-
tored into the manufacturers’ decisions whether to implement the 
TPMs—quite the contrary. 
                                                                                                                   
that the code in the printer was freely accessible to anyone in possession of the printer, so 
that the chip did not really serve as an access control. See id. at 546. A manufacturer 
might be able to avoid this outcome simply by encrypting the code in the printer.  
 78. In Chamberlain, the manufacturer of a garage door opener system charged that 
compatible remote controls manufactured by a competitor were devices that circumvented 
a frequently changed code designed to control access to a computer program that activated 
the garage door opener motor. 381 F.3d at 1183. The court denied the claim, based on a 
narrow reading of the anticircumvention provisions, according to which there could be no 
actionable trafficking in the absence of an act that circumvents an access control. Id. at 
1203-04. The court held that circumvention would occur only if the access was without the 
copyright owner’s authorization—a circumstance not present under the facts of the case 
because consumers who owned the garage door openers were authorized to engage in ac-
cess of the computer program as necessary to operate the opener. Id.; see also Storage 
Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (discussing Chamberlain). A manufacturer might avoid this outcome by selling its 
products subject to a contractual restriction against using an unauthorized device to access 
code contained within its products. See Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Conse-
quences: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 487, 513 (2005). The Chamberlain court expressly declined to decide this point. 381 
F.3d. at 1202 n.17. However, in other contexts courts have been willing to enforce contrac-
tual limitations of statutory user rights. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 
(8th Cir. 2005) (contractual waiver of reverse engineering right); Bowers v. Baystate 
Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (same). 
 79. See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management 
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 567 (2005) (“It remains unclear how robust these 
particular results will be.”); Marcus Howell, Note, The Misapplication of the DMCA to the 
Aftermarket, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 128, 145 (2005) (“Although both circuit courts have 
ruled in favor of the aftermarket manufacturer, neither case conclusively holds that after-
market manufacturers are free from DMCA liability.”). Some commenters have likewise 
noted threats to competition posed by the anticircumvention rules. See Section 1201 
Rulemaking, supra note 58 (Comment of Jonathan R. Newman and Robert Pinkerton, 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/granick_wirelessalliance.pdf) 
(mobile telephone manufacturers invoking Section 1201 to prevent use of their phones on 
competing networks).  
 80. It has been noted that this could lead to a world in which car repairs could be ac-
complished only by buying replacement parts from the original equipment manufacturer, 
with lower-priced aftermarket suppliers put out of business. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 552 
(Merritt, J., concurring) (“If we were to adopt Lexmark’s reading of the statute, manufac-
turers could potentially create monopolies for replacement parts simply by using similar, 
but more creative, lock-out codes. Automobile manufacturers, for example, could control 
the entire market of replacement parts for their vehicles by including lock-out chips.”); 
Daniel C. Higgs, Note, Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. & 
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.: The DMCA and Durable Goods Af-
termarkets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 59, 77 (2004); Lance C. McCardle, Comment, Despite 
Congress’s Good Intentions, the DMCA’s Anti-Circumvention Provisions Produce a Bad Re-
sult—A Means to Create Monopolies, 50 LOY. L. REV. 997, 1021 (2004). 
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IV.   REGULATORY RESPONSE TO EXTERNALITIES
 The discussion in Part II showed that the process of creative au-
thorship gives rise to positive externalities: benefits that, in the ab-
sence of any legal rules preventing it, may be appropriated by third 
parties without the creator’s authorization. This appropriability was 
seen to be a special case of a more general phenomenon, in which all 
kinds of productive activity yield benefits that may be appropriated 
by third parties. The result of this uncompensated appropriation of 
value may be an undersupply of productive efforts, including both 
creative authorship and production of ordinary goods, since produc-
ers are not rewarded with the full social value that flows from their 
efforts. The law responds with assignments of rights (copyright, pat-
ents, trade secrecy, trademark) that allow the producer to limit—to 
an extent that is determined by public policy—the appropriability of 
the value created by its efforts. 
 The discussion in Part III showed that publishers’ use of TPMs 
gives rise to negative externalities: societal harms that, in the ab-
sence of any legal rules to the contrary, are not factored into the pub-
lisher’s decision whether to implement TPMs. The result is an over-
supply of TPMs, since the publishers are insulated from the full so-
cial costs of this choice of productive technique. 
 Just as appropriability of the fruits of creative authorship was 
seen to be an aspect of the more general phenomenon of appropriabil-
ity of the spinoffs of productive activity, so too externalization of 
costs through use of TPMs may be viewed as an aspect of the more 
general problem of externalization of the costs of productive activity. 
The paradigmatic externalization of costs of production is pollution. 
A factory releases pollutants into the air, which harms the health of 
individuals living downwind or releases pollutants into a lake and 
reduces the catch of fishermen. The company that owns the factory 
does not experience the harms to health or fishing yields and so does 
not factor the costs of those harms into its decision whether to im-
plement less polluting, but more expensive, production methods. As a 
result, the factory owner decides to pollute, even if the pollution could 
be eliminated at a cost less than the value of the harms that the pollu-
tion causes. The decision to pollute is economically inefficient. 
 An analogy may thus be drawn between a publisher’s use of TPMs 
and a manufacturer’s use of polluting manufacturing technologies. 
Both are activities that impose costs upon third parties, which the 
profit-maximizing producer will be disinclined to factor into its choice 
of productive methods. It follows that, for the same reasons that 
regulators have established rules and incentives aimed at reducing 
producers’ output of pollution, regulators should intervene to reduce 
publishers’ output of TPMs. 
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 Note that the goal of regulatory intervention is not to eliminate
the activity that gives rise to negative externalities but only to re-
duce that activity to the efficient level. Thus, the goal of environ-
mental policy is not to eliminate all polluting activities—which could 
only be done by banning automobiles, ending the production of elec-
tricity, and generally calling all industrial activity to a halt; the goal 
is rather to cause polluters to invest in pollution controls up to the 
point where additional controls would yield no net societal benefit. In 
the same way, my proposal does not aim at eliminating use of TPMs, 
but only at reducing use of TPMs to the efficient level. 
 In considering possible regulatory responses to the inefficient 
overuse of TPMs, we may seek guidance from the types of regulatory 
efforts that have been made to prevent inefficient overproduction of 
pollution. The advantages and disadvantages of each of these ap-
proaches, as applied to internalize the social costs of TPMs, are can-
vassed in the following. 
A.   Traditional Command and Control 
 Following the traditional command-and-control approach, the 
government would determine the optimal deployment of TPMs by 
each publisher with respect to each product and would require pub-
lishers to abide by those limitations or face the threat of legal sanc-
tion. The regulator’s goal is to minimize the sum of the harms caused 
by productive activity and the costs of preventing those harms.81 This 
can be accomplished by compelling the producer to introduce preven-
tative measures just up to the point where the gains to society from 
the prevention equal the costs to the producer of engaging in preven-
tion.82 Both overinvestment and underinvestment in prevention are 
deviations from optimality: the former by resulting in outlays for 
prevention that are not justified by their benefits, the latter by 
continuing to produce externalized harms that could have been 
prevented at a cost lower than that experienced by the victims of 
the harms. 
 In the case of pollution, prevention costs consist of expenditures 
the producer must incur to eliminate the external harms caused by 
its pollution (or some portion of them) while maintaining the same 
level of productive output.83 By analogy, the “output” attributable to 
                                                                                                                   
 81. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An 
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724 (1996) (“[W]e take the social goal to be the 
minimization of the sum of harm and prevention costs.”). 
 82. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 578 (5th ed. 1999). 
 83. Alternatively, the producer might choose to reduce pollution by reducing its level 
of productive activity, if doing so would be less costly (taking into account the forgone prof-
its on forgone production) than maintaining the same level of production while installing 
pollution controls. 
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TPMs is a reduction in unauthorized use of the work of authorship 
that the TPM protects. Thus, prevention costs for publishers consist 
of what it would cost publishers to maintain the limits on unau-
thorized use brought about by TPMs, using alternative methods 
that do not result in externalized harms.84 Such alternative meth-
ods might include, for example, an aggressive program of enforce-
ment of copyrights.85
 Formulation of rules about TPM usage thus requires that the gov-
ernment regulator have information about both the magnitude of the 
externalized harms resulting from deployment of TPMs and the costs 
that publishers would incur to prevent unauthorized use through 
other means. Both of these types of information are likely to be diffi-
cult and expensive for the regulator to obtain. We might expect that 
publishers, which have a strong incentive to discover and implement 
the most cost-effective methods for preventing unauthorized uses of 
their products, would have better information as to their own costs 
than is readily available to regulators.86 If that is the case, then a 
purely regulatory approach in effect wastes informational re-
sources.87 In addition, the administrative cost of determining the 
right level of TPMs would be very large, and this must be accounted 
for as a component of the cost of prevention. 
 Accordingly, the regulator should consider approaches that incor-
porate market mechanisms to take maximum advantage of informa-
tion in the hands of private parties. 
                                                                                                                   
 84. The relevant cost here is the increased cost to the publisher of using alternative 
methods rather than TPMs, since deployment of TPMs is not costless. We can presume 
that the alternative methods cost more for a given effect; otherwise publishers would be us-
ing them in favor of TPMs. 
 85. In 2003, the trade association of the record labels, the Recording Industry Asso-
ciation of America, launched such a litigation strategy against those who share .mp3 music 
files without the labels’ authorization. As of March 2007, the industry had sued about 
18,000 individuals. See Hiawatha Bray, Record Firms Crack Down on Campuses, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2007, at D1. Another approach is to place contractual restrictions on uses 
that may be made of copyrighted materials. Some courts have upheld such contractual re-
strictions against a challenge that they are preempted by the Copyright Act. See, e.g.,
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that Copyright 
Act did not preempt contract); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453, 1455 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (same); eScholar, LLC v. Otis Educ. Sys., Inc., 387 F.Supp.2d 329, 331-33 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same). Depending on their content, such restrictions might or might not 
entail negative externalities. 
 86. For the plausibility of that assumption in the general case, see Kaplow & Shavell, 
supra note 81, at 725 n.36 (assuming that injurers know their prevention costs better than 
the state). 
 87. See Eric Kades, Preserving a Precious Resource: Rationalizing the Use of Antibiot-
ics, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 611, 637 (2005); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 81, at 725-27. In view 
of the value of harnessing the informational resources of private parties, what accounts for 
the continued existence of command-and-control regulation? One possibility is that incen-
tives-based approaches may involve monitoring costs that outweigh their informational 
advantages. See Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice,
10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 256-59 (2000). 
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B.   Coasean Bargaining 
 The most market-oriented regulatory response is for the regulator 
to refrain from any direct regulation, aiming instead to create condi-
tions that make it easier for private parties to negotiate efficient out-
comes. This approach derives from the well-known Coase Theorem, 
which states that, under a certain set of idealized conditions, bar-
gaining among affected parties will bring about the efficient level of 
production of externalities, regardless of the distribution of property 
rights.88 In the pollution example, if the factory owner has an abso-
lute legal right to pollute, downwind residents will bargain with the 
owner and pay it a sum of money to implement the efficient level of 
pollution control—that is, the level such that the cost of reducing pol-
lution further would exceed the benefits to the residents. If, on the 
other hand, the residents have an absolute right to clean air, the fac-
tory owner will pay them a sum of money for permission to engage in 
that same, efficient level of pollution.89
 Coasean bargaining may be effective when there are only a few in-
terested parties, the parties have good information about the rele-
vant costs and benefits, and the costs of bargaining are low, but these 
conditions are absent from most real-world situations. In the case of 
the factory creating air pollution, there are many parties involved 
(everyone living downwind from the factory), which gives rise to a 
collective action problem in which individuals have an incentive to 
avoid paying their fair share of the pollution-reduction costs.90 It is 
costly to engage in negotiations involving so many participants. Fur-
thermore, it is difficult for any individual to calculate the monetary 
value of the harm he experiences due to the pollution. 
 For similar reasons, we cannot count on Coasean bargaining to 
reduce the implementation of TPMs to an efficient level. Those who 
experience the externalized harms of TPMs are numerous and scat-
tered. They include people whose fair-use access to copyrighted 
works is impaired and those who are deprived of the benefits of a 
secondary market in copies of goods in digital formats. They may in-
clude anyone who experiences higher costs for consumer goods or re-
duced selection due to anticompetitive applications of TPMs. Bar-
gaining involving so many individuals, as well as a multiplicity of 
publishers, would be prohibitively expensive. It would also be impos-
sible for individuals to engage in rational bargaining, since few could 
place a monetary value on the detriments they experience from the 
use of TPMs in third-party transactions. Furthermore, many of those 
                                                                                                                   
 88. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 89. For discussion of the idea of an efficient level of pollution, see VARIAN, supra note 
82, at 576-78. 
 90. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
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harmed by TPMs are not presently available to engage in bargain-
ing: they belong to future generations that may experience the 
detriments of a contracted public domain and reduced innovation 
and competition.91
 This conclusion, that Coasean bargaining is not likely to be effec-
tive in bringing about an efficient level of production of negative ex-
ternalities through implementation of technological protection meas-
ures, is paralleled by the unquestioned premise that such bargaining 
will not yield the efficient level of authors’ capture of the positive ex-
ternalities of their creative efforts. If Coasean bargaining were feasi-
ble in this context, there would be no need for copyright, patent, or 
trade secret protection.  
 Book authors, for example, could be expected to bargain with their 
(prospective) readers to obtain compensation sufficient to motivate 
their authorial efforts. An author could offer a prospectus for a new 
book on the open market and invite interested members of the public 
to pay him money in an amount representing the utility that each 
expects to enjoy from reading the book. In determining how much to 
contribute, each member of the public would need to take into account 
not only the expected value of the book to him personally but also the 
present value to him of the book’s availability to his children and later 
descendants, who are unable to enter subscriptions themselves.  
 If the author received enough such contributions to make it worth 
his while to write the book, then he would do so. If not, then he would 
not write the book and could either keep the money92 or return it to 
the subscribers, as he calculated would best promote his interests.93
With either outcome, the result is efficient. If the book is written, 
that indicates that the social benefit from writing the book exceeds 
the author’s opportunity cost. If the book is not written, that is be-
cause society values the author’s services more highly if directed to 
some activity other than writing the book. Copyright protection 
would be superfluous.94
                                                                                                                   
 91. Eric Kades notes an analogous intertemporal externality in the context of overuse 
of antibiotics, resulting in accelerated bacterial resistance and less effective medication in 
the future. See Kades, supra note 87, at 627 (“[T]he very use of antibiotics imposes an ex-
ternal cost on later potential consumers.”). 
 92. There would be no unfairness in this, since after all the subscribers were contrib-
uting amounts based on the possibility that a book would be written, and they got what 
they paid for, in the same sense that purchasers of losing lottery tickets paid for the possi-
bility of winning a large sum of money. 
 93. He might choose to return the money if he thought that doing so would increase 
the total quantity of subscriptions to his next proposed book by an amount exceeding what 
he could have retained from the first subscription. 
 94. Bestselling author Stephen King tried something similar a few years ago. King 
began releasing chapters of a new novel, called The Plant, in monthly installments, for 
download from the Web according to an honor system: those who downloaded were asked 
to pay King a dollar for each chapter. David D. Kirkpatrick, A Stephen King Online Horror 
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 In the same way, a prospective inventor could offer the public the 
opportunity to subscribe to his inventive efforts. Inventions that soci-
ety valued highly enough would get invented, and others would not. 
There would be no need for patents, eliminating a significant claim 
on society’s resources.95
 With trade secret protection the bidding would go in the other di-
rection. Yum! Brands, Inc. would pay each member of the public 
whatever he required to refrain from making competitive use of the 
recipe for the eleven herbs and spices that distinguish Kentucky 
Fried Chicken from its imitators. If the total price was too high for 
Yum to stomach, that would simply mean that secrecy of the recipe is 
worth less to Yum than its free dissemination is worth to the public. 
Yum’s profits would drop, but fried chicken lovers would gain in an 
amount that more than compensates. 
 The Coasean bargaining hypothesized in the preceding para-
graphs is unlikely to come about. The transaction costs entailed by 
all that bargaining would swamp the subscriptions that could result 
from it. Individuals in the copyright and patent scenarios would be 
tempted to free ride: each would reason that if he withheld his own 
contribution the book would still get written, so nobody would con-
tribute.96 In the trade secret scenario there would be the problem of 
holdouts: many individuals would want to charge the trade secret 
owner a high price, reasoning that their own agreement was essen-
tial to the continued value of the secret, with the result that the total 
demanded would outstrip the secret’s value. 
 Widespread recognition of the limits of Coasean bargaining in this 
context has resulted in government intervention in the market in the 
form of copyright, patent, and trade secret protection. For the same 
reasons, we should not expect Coasean bargaining to bring about the 
efficient level of TPM use by publishers. 
C.   Pigouvian Taxes 
 Another widely implemented approach to correcting production 
externalities is to impose a tax on the producer that is calibrated to 
give the producer an incentive to reduce to an efficient level the 
                                                                                                                   
Tale Turns into a Mini-Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at C1. King declared that he 
would keep writing and releasing chapters as long as at least 75% of downloaders paid the 
dollar. Id. By the fifth installment, only 46% of downloaders paid the fee. Id. Accordingly, 
as promised, King put the project on hold. See id. 
 95. Mark Lemley estimates that the processing of patent applications in the U.S. Pat-
ent and Trademark Office costs more than $4 billion annually. Mark A. Lemley, Rational 
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1499 (2001). 
 96. The failure of Stephen King’s serialized, downloadable novel, supra note 94, might 
perhaps be attributable to free ridership. King is after all one of the most successful novel-
ists of recent decades, and The Plant might have been a success if copyright and exclud-
ability had been available to prevent free ridership. 
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quantity of social costs resulting from its activity.97 This approach, 
which relies on marketplace incentives to a greater extent than does 
straightforward regulation but to a lesser extent than does Coasean 
bargaining, is sometimes called a Pigouvian tax, after the economist 
Arthur Pigou, who first proposed it.98 An unregulated producer will 
rationally set its pollution emissions at a level such that the mar-
ginal benefit from increasing pollution emissions is zero.99 Because 
the producer does not take account of the harms that its pollution 
causes to others, the level of pollution emitted will be higher than the 
socially optimal level. When a tax per unit of pollution is applied, the 
producer’s net marginal gain from increasing pollution emissions will 
be reduced by the amount of the tax at any given level of production; 
conversely, the cost to the producer of controlling emissions will be 
reduced by the amount of tax that the producer saves for the pollu-
tion that is abated. If the tax is set at the correct level, the rational 
producer will choose to emit pollution100 at the socially optimal 
level.101
 The same approach may be applied to induce publishers to reduce 
their implementation of TPMs to the socially optimal level. Since 
publishers are not currently required to take any cognizance of the 
harms that their use of TPMs imposes on third parties, they produce 
more than the socially optimal level of TPMs. A tax at the appropri-
ate level would motivate publishers to reduce their output of TPMs to 
the socially optimal quantity. As with the example of pollution, the 
goal is not to eliminate the use of TPMs; doing so would be ineffi-
cient, since by hypothesis a reduction below the socially optimal 
level harms the publisher more than it benefits society. The goal is 
rather to minimize the sum of the cost of replacing TPMs with 
methods that do not create negative externalities and the external-
ized harms that remain.102
                                                                                                                   
 97. Examples of such taxes in the context of pollution control include those on ozone-
depleting chemicals, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681-82 (2000), and gas-guzzling vehicles, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 4064 (2000). See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
319, 344 n.127 (2005). For a skeptical assessment of the use of taxes to affect producer and 
consumer behavior, see generally Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis 
of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1989). 
 98. See ARTHUR PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1962). 
 99. The premise of this approach is that at some level of pollution emissions, the mar-
ginal benefit to the producer of increasing emissions begins to decrease monotonically. 
That is, switching to production methods that result in the creation of more pollution 
yields continually lesser benefits, until at some point there is no more net benefit to be 
gained by increasing pollution. See VARIAN, supra note 82, at 578. 
 100. Pigouvian taxes have been proposed as a response to externalities in other con-
texts not involving pollution. See Kades, supra note 87, at 638-39 (proposing tax to control 
overuse of antibiotics). 
 101. For a graphical illustration of the theory underlying Pigouvian taxes, see Appendix B. 
 102. See VARIAN, supra note 82. 
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 A TPM tax has the advantage of taking account of the different 
costs for alternatives faced by different publishers. With command-
and-control, each publisher must reduce its TPM usage to the level 
specified by the regulator, regardless of its costs in doing so. With a 
TPM tax, publishers facing higher alternative costs (for example, 
those that experience unauthorized use by a large number of small 
users, making litigation more expensive than it is for publishers that 
are faced with a smaller number of large users) will find it economi-
cally advantageous to engage in relatively little TPM reduction, 
while those facing lower alternative costs will engage in more TPM 
reduction.103 If the TPM tax is set at the proper level, the result is the 
same overall reduction in TPMs at a lower total cost to society.104
 The principal difficulty with this approach is that the regulator is 
likely to lack accurate information about the externalized harm re-
sulting from TPMs. However, modifying incentives through taxation 
has an advantage over command-and-control regulation in that it at 
least harnesses the producer’s presumptively better information 
about its own costs: it is the publisher, not the regulator, that decides 
what level of TPMs to implement, taking into account the TPM tax 
and the costs of alternatives to TPMs.105
 Moreover, uncertainty about empirical inputs is endemic to all 
forms of regulation, including existing applications of Pigouvian 
taxes.106 The “gas guzzler” tax is an example of an effort by Congress 
to modify producer and consumer behavior through Pigouvian taxes 
that is based on impressionistic rather than rigorously empirical in-
puts.107 As enacted in 1978, the provision imposed a set of excise 
taxes on manufacturers of automobiles that fall below specified fuel 
economy standards.108 For model years 1986 and later,109 the tax was 
zero for cars with a fuel economy of at least 22.5 miles per gallon, ris-
ing in steps to $3,850 for each car produced that was rated at less 
than 12.5 mpg.110 The legislative history of the provision does not dis-
                                                                                                                   
 103. The larger the range of avoidance costs among different firms, the larger the po-
tential efficiency gain from an incentive-based as compared to a command-and-control ap-
proach. See Richards, supra note 87, at 255-56. 
 104. See JOHN M. LEVY, ESSENTIAL MICROECONOMICS FOR PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS
180-81 (1995). 
 105. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 106. See LEVY, supra note 104, at 180-81.   
 107. See Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, §201, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 108. Id.
 109. Different sets of rates applied to model years 1980-85. Id. § 201(a). 
 110. The full table of taxes was as follows: 
   At least 22.5   $0 
   At least 21.5 but less than 22.5   500 
   At least 20.5 but less than 21.5   650 
   At least 19.5 but less than 20.5   850 
   At least 18.5 but less than 19.5   1,050 
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close any econometric justification for the setting of these tax rates; 
that is, there is no stated empirical basis from which to conclude that 
that the selected tax rates will depress demand for low-fuel-economy 
cars to the “correct” level.111 Given the scientific uncertainties con-
cerning the harms resulting from increased consumption of gasoline 
and the difficulty in monetizing harms such as increased vulnerabil-
ity of the economy to foreign supply interruptions, we could hardly 
expect a purely analytical approach to setting the excise tax level. 
Underlining the empirical uncertainty is the fact that in the 1990 
amendment of the “gas guzzler” tax, Congress simply doubled each of 
the 1978 tax amounts.112 Like the establishment of the original set of 
tax levels in 1978, the doubling of the tax schedule in 1990 reflected 
a political judgment based on impressionistic factors rather than 
hard-edged econometrics. 
 An analogous lack of empirical grounding underlies Congress’s 
calibration of the level of legal protection applying to creative au-
thorship. A truly scientific regime of intellectual property protection 
would be based on empirical determinations of the value resulting 
from creative authorship that is appropriable by third parties and 
would be calibrated to allow that value (but no more) to be retained 
by the authors. But the life of intellectual property protection has not 
been logic: it has been experience.113 The empirical data needed for 
such a scientific approach have never been assembled and probably 
never could be.114 Legal protection of copyrights and patents sprang 
                                                                                                                   
   At least 17.5 but less than 18.5   1,300 
   At least 16.5 but less than 17.5   1,500 
   At least 15.5 but less than 16.5   1,850 
   At least 14.5 but less than 15.5   2,250 
   At least 13.5 but less than 14.5   2,700 
   At least 12.5 but less than 13.5   3,200 
   Less than 12.5   3,850 
Id.
 111. From an economic standpoint, the correct levels of excise taxes are those which in-
ternalize all of the incremental external harms (such as harm to the environment in the 
form of increased air pollution, global warming, and oil spills; harm to future generations 
through depletion of nonrenewable fossil fuels; and additional military expenditures 
needed to insure a supply of foreign oil) resulting from use of low-fuel-economy cars. As is 
always the case, both underdeterrence and overdeterrence of an activity that has both 
beneficial and harmful consequences results in an overall loss to society. 
 112. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1338, 
§ 11216(a). 
 113. This of course paraphrases the famous Holmesian epigram. OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic; it has 
been experience.”). 
 114. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 531, 563 (2005) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine empirical studies that would accurately 
identify the precise tradeoff necessary to achieve the optimal level of property protection.”); 
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 369 
(1996) (“[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to determine with any degree of precision the 
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from a conviction that works of authorship and inventions would be 
underproduced if authors and inventors were not enabled to capture 
some of the value they created that would otherwise be freely appro-
priable,115 but the drafters of the Statute of Anne,116 the Venetian 
Law of 1474,117 the federal patent118 and copyright119 statutes in the 
1790s, and their successor enactments did not rely upon econometric 
modeling to determine the correct level of protection. Levels of pro-
tection have instead been set through the interplay of political forces. 
 The same is true of the levies on recording equipment and blank 
media established by the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA).120 The 
levies, amounting to two percent of the price of recording equipment 
and three percent of the price of blank media,121 are paid by manufac-
turers and importers into a fund that is distributed to musicians, 
songwriters, performers, and others involved in making musical re-
cordings.122 The rationale for the levy system is that it compensates 
the recipients for the loss of income that presumptively results from 
the use of digital audio recording devices to make unauthorized cop-
ies of musical recordings.123 Consistent with this rationale, the roy-
alty rates should be set at a level that generates a sum equivalent to 
the music industry’s lost income.  
                                                                                                                   
term of copyright that would lead to optimum support for creative autonomy, while still al-
lowing for sufficient user access.”). 
 115. Providing incentives to create has always been the dominant justification for 
copyright and patent protection in Anglo-American law, as is evident from the wording of 
the Intellectual Property Clause itself: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts 
. . . .” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. A moral-rights basis for copyright coexists with the in-
strumentalist rationale, see William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: 
Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 911 (1997), but has never been the 
driving force behind copyright legislation. See Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Framers Include It with Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 361, 369-73 (1992) (discussing the motivation behind the enactment of state 
copyright laws in the 1780s). 
 116. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, 8 (1710) (Eng.). 
 117. The Venetian Law of 1474, generally regarded as the first patent law, is discussed 
in Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Re-
gime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 330-32 (2005). 
 118. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318. 
 119. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 120. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2000). 
 121. The devices and media within the scope of the levy are defined, roughly speaking, 
to include those devices that are designed primarily for use by individuals in making digi-
tal copies of musical recordings. Id. §§ 1001(3), -(4)(A) (definitions of “digital audio re-
cording device” and “digital audio recording medium”). The immediate target of the levy 
system was digital audio tape technology, which at the time of enactment of the AHRA was 
just beginning to enter the market. 
 122. Id. § 1004 (stating royalty payment rates); id. § 1006 (allocating royalty payments 
among several classes of recipients). 
 123. H.R. REP. NO. 102-780, pt. 1, at 56 (1992) (“Enactment . . . will ensure that all af-
fected rights owners and beneficiaries will be compensated for the copying of their works 
on digital audio recording media . . . .”). 
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 But the data needed to derive this sum would be difficult or im-
possible to obtain. It would require determining how much unauthor-
ized copying of recorded music occurs in private homes and how 
much of that copying would have been converted into purchases of 
commercial recordings if the recording technology had been unavail-
able. A Senate report refers to “[n]umerous reports” that “seek to 
quantify the exact effect home taping has upon the music indus-
try.”124 The reports that it mentions, however, state only broad esti-
mates as to the extent of unauthorized taping and do not provide any 
basis for determining the level of the music industry’s lost income. 
 In fact, the royalty rates that are included in the statute derive 
not from any econometric study but from an agreement between rep-
resentatives of the music industry and representatives of the con-
sumer electronics industry. In 1990, songwriters and music publish-
ers filed a lawsuit against Sony Corp., a manufacturer of DAT re-
corders, claiming that provision of the devices would constitute con-
tributory copyright infringement.125 A year later the parties arrived 
at a settlement, embodying a compromise agreement that “was in-
corporated into a legislative proposal and introduced in the Senate 
and the House.”126 Included within that compromise was a schedule 
of royalty rates, which is identical to the rates as enacted.127
 Thus, the AHRA royalty rates were set by political compromise, as 
was the case with the gas-guzzler tax and as has always been the 
case in setting the level of protection provided by intellectual prop-
erty laws.128 The same procedure can be used to set the level of the 
TPM tax. It is unlikely that such a procedure will arrive at a tax that 
results in the optimal deployment of TPMs, but then neither does the 
current level of the tax—zero—yield that result.  
                                                                                                                   
 124. S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 34 (1992). 
 125. See Gary S. Lutzker, Note, DAT’s All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home 
Recording Act of 1991—Merrie Melodies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
145, 164-70 (1992) (discussing Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 
1991).
 126. S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 33 (1992); see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-780, pt. 1, at 19 
(1992) (the “compromise is embodied in the [proposed] legislation.”). 
 127. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 102-873, pt. 1, at 29-30 (1992), with 17 U.S.C. § 1004. 
 128. Several commentators have proposed the imposition of a levy to compensate copy-
right owners for revenues lost as a result of peer-to-peer file sharing. Under one such pro-
posal, the amount of the levy would be arrived at through political compromise. See Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 44 (2003) (“The amount of the [levy] would be deter-
mined (and periodically adjusted) through negotiations between associations representing 
the industries upon which the levy is imposed and associations representing holders of 
rights in different categories of works.”). Other proposals are vague about how the amount 
of the levy would be determined. See Ku, supra note 36, at 312-14; Jessica Litman, Sharing 
and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 40-42 (2004). 
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D.   Cap and Trade 
 Another regulatory response to externalities that might be consid-
ered as a means of controlling TPM usage is a system of tradable 
permits allowing the holder to engage in the regulated activity, often 
referred to as “cap and trade.”129 This approach had its origin in the 
context of environmental regulation. The system is conceptually very 
simple—consisting of (1) a legal prohibition on engaging in the regu-
lated activity except as provided in a permit assigned to the entity 
that engages in the activity; (2) an initial allocation to regulated enti-
ties of permits allowing them to engage in a certain quantity of the 
regulated activity; and (3) a provision for the transferability of the per-
mits, allowing regulated entities to buy and sell permits in a market.130
 The principal advantage offered by the system is that (at least in 
theory) it brings about the desired level of the regulated activity at a 
lower social cost than other systems of regulation. It does this by tak-
ing advantage of the fact that some entities can reduce their level of 
the regulated activity at a lower cost than other entities. Transfer-
ability of the allowances enables a shifting of the desired conduct to 
entities that can engage in it at the lowest cost.131
 A well-established implementation of the cap-and-trade system is 
the acid rain reduction program, created by the Clean Air Act132 and 
administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.133 The 
program is designed to reduce the quantity of sulfur dioxide (SO2)
emitted by utilities in the generation of electricity.134 Each year, the 
EPA assigns to each generating unit a quantity of allowances permit-
ting it to emit a certain amount of SO2 during that year.135 A utility 
that expects to emit more SO2 than it is allowed may come into com-
pliance either by reducing its emissions or by buying the right to 
emit more than its allowance. Conversely, a utility that emits less 
than its allowance may either relax its emission-control efforts or 
may sell the right to emit the unneeded portion of its allowance.136 If 
an over-emitting utility would have to pay more to reduce its emis-
                                                                                                                   
 129. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Envi-
ronmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 617-18 (2000). 
 130. Id.
 131. See Jeffrey M. Hirsh, Emission Allowance Trading Under the Clean Air Act: A 
Model for Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 352, 354-55 (1999). 
 132. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2000). 
 133. The EPA’s regulations are at 40 C.F.R. 72-79 (2006). 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 7651. The program also aims at reduction of nitrogen oxide emissions, 
but not through a system of tradable allowances. 
 135. The total quantity of allowances will decline from 9.5 million in 2004 to 8.95 million in 
2010, each allowance permitting discharge of one ton of SO2. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ACID
RAIN PROGRAM 2004 PROGRESS REPORT 4-5 [hereinafter ACID RAIN PROGRESS REPORT], avail-
able at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/docs/2004report.pdf. 
 136. See Hirsh, supra note 131, at 354. 
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sions by a ton than an under-emitting utility would gain through re-
laxing its emissions control by the same amount, then both utilities 
can benefit from a transfer of a one-ton permit.137 The transfer also 
results in a social benefit, since by hypothesis the emission reduction 
will be accomplished through a lower expenditure of resources than if 
the over-emitting utility was required to reduce its emissions.  
 An analogous system of tradable allowances could be applied to 
publishers using TPMs. The regulator would begin by setting an ag-
gregate TPM budget—that is, determining what quantity of allow-
ances for TPM-generated negative externalities would be allocated to 
publishers. Establishing a valid metric would be the first hurdle. 
Without a metric, it would be impossible for the regulator to specify 
what types of TPM usage an allowance allows or to assess a pub-
lisher’s compliance with the limitations created by the allowance sys-
tem. The premise of a cap-and-trade system is that the aggregate 
output of the regulated activity is unchanged by the transfer of al-
lowances from one regulated entity to another. The regulator must 
therefore have a criterion for determining whether the entity acquir-
ing an allowance engages in the same quantity of the regulated activ-
ity as the original holder of the allowance was allowed. 
 In the present context, identifying an adequate metric for TPMs 
would be quite difficult.138 The regulator would in principle have to 
determine the economic value of the externalized harm resulting 
from any given use of a TPM. The magnitude of that harm would 
vary not only with the type of TPM (for example, tethering versus 
anticopy technologies) but also with the content of the TPM-protected 
work. For example, a tethering control on a tax-preparation software 
program might create less harm (through elimination of a secondary 
market) than the same control on a word-processing program, since 
the former has value to users only during a limited time period while 
the latter may have value indefinitely. 
                                                                                                                   
 137. The price at which the allowance changes hands depends on the market. For ex-
ample, suppose that Utility A must reduce its emissions by one ton of SO2 and that Utility 
B currently emits one ton less than it is allowed. To reduce its emissions by that one ton, 
Utility A would have to install pollution-control equipment costing $1,000. If it chose to 
emit an additional ton, Utility B would save $500 in pollution-control costs. Under this 
scenario, both utilities would be made better off by Utility B’s sale of a one-ton permit to 
Utility A at some price between $500 and $1,000. In a well-functioning market, the price 
will depend on the aggregate supply and demand of the permits. Trading of allowances is 
active. In 2004, 7.5 million allowances were transferred between economically unrelated 
parties. See ACID RAIN PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 135, at 6-8. 
 138. I have previously suggested that for purposes of analysis a metric could be devel-
oped through operation of a “shadow market” that measures consumer antipathy to par-
ticular TPM implementations. See Rothchild, supra note 47, at 518 n.107. But this meth-
odology would fail to capture the externalized harms from TPM use that, by definition, are 
not of concern to the user of a TPM-protected item. 
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 However, difficulty in identifying an appropriate metric is not 
unique to this context. The same problem surfaces when devising 
cap-and-trade programs to control environmental pollutants. For ex-
ample, acreage is the simplest metric to employ in measuring wet-
lands, but depending on the policy objective in preserving wetlands, 
one acre is not necessarily the equivalent of another. Thus, a cap-
and-trade program that uses acreage as the metric will not necessar-
ily preserve the environmental benefits of wetlands at which the pro-
gram is aimed.139 Even where the regulated activity is fungible in na-
ture, there may be nonfungibilities along the dimensions of time and 
space that a given metric fails to account for adequately.140 Thus, 
even though a ton of SO2 is physically the same no matter which util-
ity plant emitted it, using tons of SO2 as the metric for the acid rain 
program disregards the consequences of concentrating emissions at 
particular times or in particular locations. 
 In the face of these difficulties, we could not hope to identify and 
implement a metric for TPM externalities that perfectly captures the 
externalized effects of TPM usage. But perfection is an unrealistic 
goal for regulation of any sort. It may be possible to devise a cap-and-
trade program for TPMs that, like the regime of legal protection for 
intellectual property, is based on a combination of econometrics, poli-
tics, estimation, and conjecture, without any pretense of perfection. 
 The effect of a well-functioning cap-and-trade program for TPMs 
would be to shift TPM usage away from publishers that get relatively 
little benefit from TPMs and toward publishers that get a relatively 
large benefit. Those that benefit relatively little (on a per-unit-of-
external-harm basis) are better off selling their allowances and forgo-
ing use of TPMs, while other publishers are better off buying allow-
ances so that they can use more TPMs. 
V.   CONCLUSION
 In this Article I have argued that in the absence of any regulatory 
limits on the use of TPMs, profit-maximizing publishers will imple-
ment TPMs at an inefficiently high level. Regulatory action aimed at 
making publishers take into account some of the externalized harms 
caused by TPMs is justified on the basis of two analogies. First, pub-
lic policy as embodied in the legal regimes of intellectual property 
protection allows authors, inventors, and producers generally to in-
ternalize some of the positive externalities resulting from their ef-
                                                                                                                   
 139. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 129, at 631 (“If our principal objective in wet-
lands protection is conservation of open space, then acres may be an adequate currency for 
a wetlands [environmental trading market]. If the goal is conservation and delivery of ser-
vices, then acres fare poorly.”). 
 140. Id. at 638-42. 
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forts; requiring publishers to internalize some of the negative exter-
nalities of TPMs seems equally justified. Second, public policy re-
quires other classes of entities generating negative externalities—in 
particular, polluters—to internalize some of the resulting costs; con-
sistency calls for placing the same requirement on publishers. 
 Of the several possible regulatory approaches I consider, tradi-
tional command-and-control regulation is not the best choice because 
it fails to take advantage of information held by market participants, 
and Coasean bargaining is impractical due to the large number of in-
terested parties and consequent high bargaining costs. Pigouvian 
taxes and cap-and-trade both do a better job of incorporating mar-
ketplace intelligence. There is no clear basis for preferring one over 
the other. In the absence of any more definitive criterion, I propose a 
cap-and-trade program as the more market-oriented of the two. Each 
of the suggested approaches has its drawbacks, but that is not a rea-
son for abandoning the project. In the real world, perfect regulation 
is as rare as a perfectly effective TPM. 
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APPENDIX A
 The equation in Part II(C)(2) is derived as follows: 
 A producer’s average total cost (ATC) consists of the total cost of 
manufacturing a given quantity of output divided by that quantity. 
The total cost of manufacturing (TC) is the sum of two components: 
the producer’s fixed cost (FC) and its total variable cost (VC). Thus,  
where q represents the quantity of output. 
If we represent the original producer’s fixed costs as FCop, then 
the amount of these costs that the second comer is able to avoid is 
,opFCA ?
where 0 < A < 1.  
 We can now compare the total costs of the original producer with 
those of the second comer. The original producer’s total cost is  
.opopop VCFCTC ??
 The advantage the second comer gains by his copying consists of 
the value it is able to appropriate minus what it costs to accomplish 
the appropriation, namely 
,scop CEFCA ??
where CEsc is the second comer’s copying expenses. 
 If we assume that the original producer and the second comer ex-
perience identical variable costs (that is, VCop = VCsc), then this ex-
pression also represents the second comer’s comparative advantage:  
)()( scscopopscop VCFCVCFCTCTC ?????
     )])[()( scscopopopop VCCEFCAFCVCFC ???????
      .scop CEFCA ???
The percentage of the second comer’s savings is the amount of those 
savings divided by the original producer’s costs, or 
.
opop
scop
VCFC
CEFCA
?
??
),()( qVCFCqTC ??
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APPENDIX B
 The use of taxes to correct misallocations of resources resulting 
from externalities may be illustrated graphically. In Figure 1, line 
MBp is the marginal benefit that a producer obtains as it shifts to in-
creasingly polluting production methods. The quantity of pollution 
that is optimal for the producer is q, where the marginal benefit is 
zero—increasing the level of pollution beyond q means incurring 
costs that exceed benefits, and polluting at a level less than q means 
forgoing some net benefits. Line MCv shows the marginal cost to vic-
tims of the pollution at different levels of pollution. The socially op-
timal level of pollution is q?, which is less than q. At this level, the 
marginal cost to the producer of reducing pollution equals the mar-
ginal benefit to the victims. The producer can be induced to reduce 
its pollution emissions to q? by imposition of a tax in the amount of t.
A tax at that level shifts the producer’s marginal benefit curve from 
MBp to MB?p, which makes q? the optimal level of pollution for both 
the producer and society. 
FIGURE 1
.
q
.
MB?p
MBp
Q of pollution 
$
MCv
q?
t
